Violence in late medieval castile: the case of the Rioja by Ruiz, Teófilo F.
REVISTA DE 
ita 
Revista de Historia 133 2U semestre de 1995 
FFLCH-USP 
199; 
VIOLENCE IN LATE MEDIEVAL CASTILE: 
THE CASE OF THE RIOJA 
Teófilo F. Ruiz 
Brooklyn College - University of New York 
RESUMO: Através do uso de estudos de casos e da análise micro-histórica, esse artigo tenta relacionar a violência da rea-
leza e da nobreza dentro do contexto da crise de Castela na Baixa Idade Média. Ao mesmo tempo, o artigo procura levan-
tar questões relativas aos métodos de resistência e mostrar como os camponeses resistiram aos ataques da nobreza e nego-
ciaram suas relações conflituosas com os poderosos. 
ABSTRACT: Through the use of case studies and micro-historical analysis, this article attempts to place royal and noble 
violence within the context of Castile's late medieval crisis. At the same time, the article tries to raise questions as methods 
of resistance and to show how peasants resisted noble attacks and negotiated their conflictive relations with the powerful. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Violência, Poder, Castela, Rioja, Idade Média. 
KEY-WORDS: Violence, Power, Castile, Rioja, Middle Ages. 
Many years ago, Johan Huizinga, opened his 
suggestive and delightful book, The Waning of the 
Middle Ages, with a chapter on the "violent tenor" of 
late medieval life. Huizinga's aim in those opening 
pages was to show how violence permeated the fabric 
of medieval life and, through colorful examples, to ex-
plore its local manifestations. Unfortunately, The 
Waning of the Middle Ages describes a specific 
region, the area of northern France and Flanders and 
does not draw an equally vivid portrait of the rest of 
European society (HUIZINGA, 1954). 
Since Huizinga's great work in 1924, historians 
have examined manifestations of violence elsewhere 
in western Europe and their impact on the structures of 
everyday life (RUGGEIRO, 1980; NIRENBERG, 1996). 
In that context, I have made in my recent book, Crisis 
and Continuity, numerous references to violence as 
one of the pervasive elements of Castilian late medi-
eval life (RUIZ, 1994). In this article, I would like to 
chart this breakdown of civic order in greater detail 
and attempt to estimate its impact on the economic 
and socia! structures of northern Casti le. 
16 Teófilo R. Ruiz I Revista de História 133 (1995), 15-36 
Introduction 
What we witness in the period after the conquest 
of Seville can be described as the institutionalization 
of noble and royal violence. Official and private 
violence and lawlessness were, in part, the conse-
quences of population decline and the concomitant 
reduction in available tax income. At the same time, 
violence, both official and private, served as a 
catalyst for the further recrudescence of the late me-
dieval crisis. Unlike France, England or Italy, 
however, Castilian peasants, artisans and bourgeoisie 
seldom took arms to avenge those crimes and abuses 
of which they were so often the unwilling victims. Or, 
at least, if they resisted, they did not do so in ways 
with which we are familiar for other parts of Europe. 
There were no great outbursts of resistance. There 
was no Jacquerie, no Ciompi, no 1381 Peasant 
rebellion. The reasons why this was so complex 
indeed. Elsewhere I have already suggested some 
explanat ions for this passivity; in this pages, 
however, I will limit myself to examining the nature of 
(he abuses and their relation to the changes which 
occurred in Castilian society in the century after 
1248 (RUIZ, 1991, 1994b). 
The Violent Tenor of Life in Late Medieval Castile 
In the late Middle Ages, the anarchic and blind 
exercise of private vengeance, excesses by the 
nobility, royal greed and cruelty reached that 
c ross roads at which, often, the normal and 
traditional avenues of arbitration and litigation were 
rendered useless (HUIZINGA, 1954, pp. 9-30)'. In 
thirteenth and early fourteenth century Castile, one 
1. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, pp. 9-30 
and e l sewhere provides an eloquent descr ipt ion of (he 
"violent tenor" of society. In Castile itself, the violence of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth century pales when compared to 
the anarchy and civil conf l ic ts of most of the fifteenth 
century. 
finds a rather paradoxical situation. On the one 
hand, the slow acceptance and growing familiarity 
with a sophisticated and ancient legal tradition 
(Roman law) led to the acceptance of Roman legal 
procedures - even if only as a supplementary code 
- in 1348. On the other hand, savage punishments 
were dealt to lawbreakers under the umbrella of the 
law, while private and official violence were often 
ignored or, worse yet, received royal sanction. 
The cycle of violence extended from the king 
down to the lowest of his subject, including 
ecclesiastics as well as laymen. The kings of Castile 
in this period, above all Sancho IV, Alfonso XI, Peter 
I, Henry II, were quite willing to take matters into their 
own hands, to be judge, jury and executioner of their 
enemies and rivals. This behavior, this abandonment 
of every pretense of legality, this giving in to their 
own violent impulses was, of course, not alien to 
either medieval kings in earlier or later centuries nor 
to the society as a whole, but, surely, in this period, 
the kings of France and England generally preferred 
their agents to carry on their dirty work while they 
remained safely enshrined in the dignity and mystery 
of their power. In Castile, however, royal personal 
violence was an indelible pattern, almost a ritual of 
passage confirming the right to rule and to power. 
The chroniclers report these deeds again and again, 
not as objectionable acts but often as corollaries to 
authority. In blind anger, but sometimes in cold and 
calculated manner, the kings of Castile struck down 
with their own hands rebellious magnates, princes of 
the blood royal and even their own brothers (RUIZ, 
1985, p. 132). 
This behavior at the top set the patterns for the 
rest of society. The ordinances of the Cortes reveal a 
world quite different from the supposedly 
"enlightened progression of legality". As late as 
1338, at a time of shrinking resources and strife, the 
level of personal violence was such as to draw a 
great deal of attention at the important Cortes held 
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that year in Burgos. The opening paragraph of the 
ordinances of the 1338 Cortes speaks of armed 
conflicts between lords, both great and small, in 
competition for property and vassals {Cortes, I, pp. 
443-444). In an attempt to end private warfare, Al-
fonso XI ordered lhe nobles and their retainers to 
forgive and forget all previous aggressions, 
condemning to death those disobeying his edict. On 
the other hand, the king gave license to those falsely 
accused and their relatives to kill (under certain 
circumstances) with impunity their slanderers. He also 
set the parameters for private challenges and duels 
without recourse to the law, so that "evil men be 
escarmentados (taught a lesson by fear) and the rest 
could live in peace." Private vengeance was permitted, 
with royal permission, as a reprisal for the death, 
wounding or imprisonment of parents, grandparents, 
brothers, uncles or nephews (Cortes, I, pp. 444-449). 
These dispositions came at a time when Alfonso XI 
had supposedly held the reins of the realm firmly in his 
hands for thirteen years and close to a century after Al-
fonso X's legislative reforms.Yet, the 1330s1 level of 
violence was most probably quite mild when compared 
with the real troubled minorities and civil wars which 
swept the kingdom in the mid 1280s, the mid 1290s 
and early 1300s, the decade between 1312 and 1322 
and the civil war in the 1360s. Although these periods 
of chaos did not even elicit royal action, we can trace 
their course by the plaintive complaints of the urban 
procurators at the meetings of the Cortes. Official and 
unofficial violence, perpetrated upon monasteries, mu-
nicipal councils and the peasantry, were part of every 
day life and will be examined below. 
In the cities, physical attacks against authorities 
by armed gangs, which came to the meetings of the 
city council and stoned the proceedings, and private 
fights reached a level in the 1330s and 1340s which 
required the attention of the king. Such was the case 
in Burgos in the 1330s, when angry groups of 
disfranchised pecheros disrupted the workings of the 
city council. These acts of violence reflected the 
unequal distribution of power and wealth within the 
Castilian urban centers and the rising level of 
frustration of those below with the status quo. Royal 
intervention was aimed as much to stop violence as 
it was to protect the interests of those above. In the 
Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, either death, 
exile and/or confiscation of property were meted to 
those guilty of murdering municipal and royal 
officials or disturbing the peace of the city (Cortes, 
I, pp. 525-526). In language reminiscent of modern 
arguments for the death penalty, the king reasoned 
that in "some cities and places in his kingdoms is the 
custom that whoever kills another in a fight is 
declared the enemy of the victim's relative and must 
pay omezillo (wergild), thus avoiding execution" or 
vendetta. Because of this, men dared to kill. Thus, the 
king ordered the death penalty for those who slay 
others in fights, unless it had been in self defense. 
Similar legislation giving license to husbands to kill 
adulterous wives and their lovers, or setting the 
death penalty for those fornicating with the 
concubine, relatives or servants of their lords reflect 
the Castilians' easy acquaintance with death, rape 
and other forms of violence, either as victims, 
perpetrators, or enforcers of the law (Cortes, I, pp. 
529-530). At the inception of his rule in 1252, Alfon-
so X, almost a century before the Ordenamiento de 
Alcalá de Henares, set the cutting of the right hand's 
thumb as penalty for the making of forbidden 
articles, such as saddles ornamented with gold and 
silver. Those stealing eggs from goshawks and 
hawks during hatching periods would lose their right 
hand, and we have seen earlier how those guilty of 
burning woods paid for their crimes by being thrown 
back into the fire (GARCÍA RAMILA, 1945, pp. 207, 
213, 215). The legislation of the period reflect vividly 
the violent tenor of life, but it does not illuminate the 
many instances of individual acts of violence and the 
arbitrary and biased workings of justice. Any perusal 
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of the extant documents shows the unlawful nature 
of the age. Unfortunately, we do not have the 
elaborate judicial and/or manorial records available 
for other kingdoms — as for example medieval and 
early modern England - for which wc have 
formidable studies of violence and of the attempts by 
authorities and individuals to prevent crime. Instead, 
one can only document a few individual cases, but 
one must not think, however, that these examples 
were exceptional. Clues to the pervading presence of 
the most serious crimes can be easily seen in the 
universal and repeated complaints of ecclesiastical 
institutions against royal, noble and municipal 
assaults on their property and dependents. Munici-
pal complaints ran along the same lines. 
Equally revealing is the reluctance of monasteries 
and chapters to relinquish their rights of omezillo — 
homicide, i.e., a tribute paid to the lord by its peasants 
(vasallos) and by the neighbors of a locality when 
someone was murdered within the jurisdiction of the 
community. Although cities, such as Burgos, had 
been exempted from this humiliating contribution as 
early as 1168 (MUÑOZ y ROMERO, 1972, pp. 267-
268), in rural villages collective responsibility for 
murders and redemption by payment remained alive 
into the fourteenth century. The monastery of San Sal-
vador of Oña, for example, jealously retained its right 
of omezillo and to caloñas in many rental agreements 
in which it let out part of its domain in return for 
payments in issue or kind. The explicit reference to this 
right, while other obligations were either commuted 
or ignored, seems to point to murder as a common 
event in rural Oña and elsewhere in the merindad of 
Asturias de Santillana and, thus, cither a profitable 
due to be kept when other ancient customs were 
allowed to lapse or retained as a deterrent (albeit not 
a very good one) to crime2. In Burgos, the city for 
2. See , for exemple, AUN. Clero, carp. 298, nü 3 
(28 .ó .1286) ; carp. 299, n= 16 (28.6.1289); carp. 300, n" 5 
which we have the best medieval documentation in 
northern Castile, we can follow royal and municipal 
concerns with crime and punishment from the mid-
thirteenth century on. Most of the extant information 
comes from royal letters, written in answer to munici-
pal inquiries or complaints on judicial matters or 
requests for the softening of royal penalties. In 1263, 
1268 and 1279, Alfonso X sought to clarify the 
procedures to be followed and the penalties to be 
imposed in a variety of issues. These criminal actions 
included fights resulting in physical harm, cursing, 
verbal abuse, obscene gestures, innuendo and such 
serious crimes as rape. In one instance, the king was 
consulted on whether the penalties for saying to 
someone fududincul (literally, to call someone a 
sodomized individual) was to be equal io fi de (son 
of) fududincul. He answered in the affirmative, 
although one would have expected his attention to 
have been engaged elsewhere in 1279, as the king 
prepared to do battle against his son, the Infante 
Sancho, for control of the realm3. In the 1330s, royal 
attention shifted to street violence with social and 
political undertones. The punitive legislation and 
royal edicts enacted during those years - and which 
were not unique to Burgos - were not intended to 
stop violence per se but to quell political unrest 
(RUIZ, 1977, pp. 26-27; RUCQUOI, 1987, pp. 294-
309; ASENJO, 1986, pp. 294-309). 
Regardless of the nature of lawlessness, one may 
envision a city, a realm, where physical aggression, 
heated and obscene gestures, verbal exchanges and 
(13.7.1290); carp. 302, nu 21 (12.11.1296); carp. 303, nü 18 
(24.2.1300) et passim. In the merindad of Asturias de 
Santillana, many of lhe villages paid rughts of omezillo to 
their lords. See Becerro 11, 010-216. 
3 AMB. classif. 2908 (6.8.1263); classif. 99 
(25.3.1268); classif. 2917 (8.4.1279). Sancho IV confirmed 
these previleges on 26 May 1285, See AMB. classif. 12], 
and a few days afterwards ordered gambling houses in 
Burgos to be closed because of the violence which occured 
in the city and in Castil de Judíos: AMB. classif. 2939 
(5.6.1285). 
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sexual abuse were part of the very fabric of life. As 
to the latter form of violence, the legislation against 
seduction and rape was certainly not aimed at 
protecting women; rather, it was designed to protect 
males from their wives ' adultery and lustful 
treachery. The language of the fueros and of royal 
legislation was quite explicit on this point: it 
sought to protect the master of the household from 
suspected issue or the judicial complications 
resulting from their wives unlawful behavior. In that 
sense, concubines, servant women and female relatives 
were treated, on matters of sexuality, as yet another 
form of property (DILLARD, 1984, pp. 170-192). 
Violent death and swift reprisals must have been 
the stuff of everyday life, The Chronicón de 
Cárdena has just two laconic entries for the year 
.1255: one reported the flooding of the river Vena and 
the other the duel of six knights, three against three. 
They met in Burgos, the challengers killing their 
enemies outright {Chronicón, p. 373). Underlying 
the tenor of violence and the exercise of justice, 
however, was the undeniable fact that if one was 
powerful or had powerful friends, one could escape 
the harshness of a legal system which demanded life 
for life. In 1274, Don Pedro el Carretero obtained, by 
the intercession of the king, the release of a man 
accused of murder, who, as the document stated, "did 
not have to die" for his crime. In 1279, Antolin 
Fernandez, a noble knight and a resident of Burgos, 
was charged with the murder of Pascual Miguel, a 
cleric in the parish of St. Peter in Burgos. He 
appealed his case to the Infante Don Sancho, 
obtaining his freedom and exemption from municipal 
retribution. The following year, to add insult to 
injury, the Infante Don Sancho exempted Antolin 
from taxes and from the jurisdiction of the city 
council of Burgos. One must assume that Antolin 
was one of Sancho's men, a knight who resided 
within the city walls, quick to anger, swift with his 
knife and sword, and, for all practical purposes, 
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free from any restrain by municipal officials'1. The 
point here is that most of the individual crimes for 
which there is surviving documentary evidence seem 
to have been committed by members of the ruling 
groups in society. This included murder and also 
breaking and entering. Such was the case of the 
armed robbery of the house of Rodrigo Ibáñez (a 
well-known moneylender, municipal official and 
member of the ruling clan of the Sarracins) perpetrated 
by Cirait Bernait (also a member of the Burgalese 
oligarchy) with the help of his relatives, Pedro Pérez 
and Pedro of Formallat, officials of the city council 
and prosperous merchants5. If we examine carefully 
the extant wills of the late middle ages, often times 
we find, besides the listing of pious donations, whole 
inventories of crimes and misdeeds. In one specific 
case, the will of Don Gonzalo Ruiz de Zúñiga, the 
document reveal a rather rich and ostentatious 
nobleman who, after a life of crime, sought to set his 
accounts in this world before entering the next one. 
His last wishes, as spelled out in his 1293 testament, 
requested burial in the portal of St. Paul, the church 
of the Dominican order in Burgos. A stone with his 
coat of arms and name was to mark his place of final 
rest. Gonzalo's fortune was considerable. It consisted 
of 1312 1/2 doblas (doubloons), which were in the 
custody of Fray Andres of Pamplona, 200 pounds 
tournois (minus 20 solidit), and thirteen gold rings. Of 
the latter, seven were set with sapphires, four with 
emeralds, one with a ruby and the last one had a 
diamond. His heirs redeemed the rings for the large 
sum of 1,400 mrs., which provides an indication of 
the high cost of precious stones as well as the 
tendency for display among the nobility. In addition, 
Gonzalo Ruiz owned six cups of silver with a 20 
marks of fine silver content, plus 304 1/2 doblas kept 
4 AMB clnsif. 2910 (16 .4 .1274) ; clnsif. 2921 
(11.11.1279); clasif. 2508 (S.8.1280). 
5. AMB clasif. 2923 (18.11.1279). 
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by the abbot of St. Paul. The testament also includes 
the usual requests for masses, charities and personal 
bequests. One should point that 1,000 mrs. were 
reserved for a rich cloth to cover his casket and 400 
mrs. for masses for the souls of two of his squires 
(BALLESTEROS, 1922-1928). 
From the will, one can also learn that Gonzalo 
Ruiz was one of the followers of the Infante Don 
Juan during the noble revolts of Sancho IV's reign. 
From the area of the Rioja and the border with 
Aragón to the lands of Burgos, the Infante "fue 
robando" (went stealing) and Gonzalo with him. 
Among his crimes, committed in the service of don 
Juan and of other princes, he listed stealing 520 
sheep, one ox, 40 pigs, one carga (a measure of 
grain) of barley, 7 cargas of wheat, 150 fanegas of 
wheat and rye taken by force from a peasant, 3 
mules, plus an assorted list of money (or the forced 
quartering expressed in issue) which he extorted from 
ecclesiastical institutions, village councils and 
individuals. This included thefts in Alvarracin for the 
sum of 2,000 mrs. The list continues for around half 
a page in the printed edition, including the burning of 
a house (valued at 40 mrs. near Salas6. These were " 
the actions of a nobleman in the service of others 
more powerful than he was. There is no reason to 
think that he was anything but typical of the actions 
of his noble contemporaries, though the mind 
boggles at what gangs of knights, such as Gonzalo, 
could have done to the well-being and collective 
peace of Castilians (VELAYOS, 1978, pp. 20-21, 66-
70). This was violence sanctioned by the political 
strife and expected in a society almost continuously 
at war in this period. And the disturbances of Sancho 
IV's reign can be considered minor when compared to 
those of Ferdinand IV and Alfonso XI's minorities. 
Even those who were not directly engaged in the 
civil strife plaguing the realm thought nothing of 
6. Ibidem. 
behaving in a violent and illegal manner. Such was 
the case of Lope Alvarez. His will was drawn in 1315, 
and it shows the casual way in which Lope took 
mules and others goods from clerics, peasants and 
shopkeepers by force or deception7. That Gonzalo 
Ruiz and Lope Alvarez sought to return their illicit 
gains (if the victims could be found and a price for 
compensation agreed upon) tell us a great deal about 
their fears of eternal damnation, The wills also tell us 
about lives of total disregard for the laws of men and 
God. At the end, of course, their repentance did little 
to atone for the suffering of their victims. 
But violence against people and property in 
Burgos and elsewhere was not the exclusive 
monopoly of the nobility. In 1366, the lame and 
physically handicapped beggars of Burgos had 
occupied illegally the hospital for the blind set up by 
the city. Not content with displacing the blind from 
their rightful refuge, the lame and handicapped also 
beat the blind regularly". 
When we turn from the area of Burgos to other 
parts of Castile, the picture docs not change very 
much. In 1256 the citizens of Osma, in open conflict 
with their bishop, attacked and burned the village of 
Sotos de Jusos and other properties of the cathedral 
of Osma. As they retreated, they also took the 
peasants' livestock with them (CORVALÁN, 1788, pp. 
84-86). Clerics themselves were as guilty of violence 
and misbehavior as everybody else. Peter Linehan's 
graphic and prurient anecdotes of ecclesiastical 
misconduct can be supplemented with many 
references to the violent behavior of the secular and 
regular clergy against each other and against the 
laity. Indeed, if the relations of the bishop and 
chapter of Burgos with the great monasteries of the 
region, Las Huelgas, Arlanza, Silos, Cárdena, is any 
indication, one could see how easily disputes could 
7. AHN Clero, carp. 241, no. 1 (29.4.1315). 
8. ACB, vol. 44, f. 180 (2.12.1366). 
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turn into open aggression. Jurisdictional conflicts, 
issues of ecclesiastical discipline, rights of property 
and other questions were a recurring theme in the 
history of the Castilian church and of the Church at 
large. The Dominican monks of St. Paul in Burgos, 
for example, sought to build a bigger house on the 
banks of the Arlanzón river, beyond the city walls. 
Their efforts were thwarted by the hostility of the 
chapter and bishop, their building stones repeatedly 
stolen from the building site1". How monks and nuns 
took justice into their own hands, especially if it 
involved financial matters, can be easily gathered 
from the long dispute between the monastery of 
Santa Maria La Real de Aguilar de Campóo and 
Doña Mayor Alvarez over the will and disposition 
of the body of Ferrando Royz de Castañeda, Doña 
Mayor's late husband, On 5 July 1329, at the house 
of Garcia Migucllcz in Valladolid, fray John, abbot 
of Santa María la Real dc Aguilar de Campóo, 
appeared before García Pérez dc Valladolid, alcalde 
of the king, Alfonso Royz, public scribe of that city, 
and other witnesses. He stated that Ferrand Royz de 
Castañeda, recently deceased, had donated to the 
monastery all his holdings in Cilia Mayor plus 500 
mrs. The terms of his will also requested burial at the 
monastery, where Ferrand's parents had already 
been laid to rest. The will was in the hands of the 
scribe and García Pérez, the alcalde, declared it 
valid'". Three and a half years later, on 6 January 
1333, Alfonso XI confirmed the decision of García 
Pérez de Valladolid on the litigation between the 
monastery and Ferrand's widow, Doña Mayor. The 
abbot charged the widow with refusing to relinquish 
the properties in Cilia Mayor. While admitting this to 
be so, doña Mayor explained that, as the funeral 
cortege made its way from Valladolid to Aguilar dc 
9. AHN Clero, carp. 184, no. 10 (17.5.1276); carp. 185, 
no. 1 (5.8.1288). See Peler Linehan's forthcoming article on 
(he disputes between the friars and lhe chapter. 
10. AHN. Clero, carp. 1669, no. 19 (5.7.1329). 
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Campóo for the burial of Ferrand Royz, they passed 
by the monastery of Avía and the abbess and nuns 
stole the body and interred Ferrand in the choir of 
their monastery. Regardless of the final disposition 
of Ferrand's mortal remains, the alcalde ordered 
Doña Mayor to comply with the financial terms of the 
will. On 29 January of the same year, Dona Mayor 
relinquished the disputed property to fray John, the 
abbot of Santa Maria la Real de Aguilar de Campóo". 
What can be learned from this incident? The 
community of Santa Maria of Aguilar de Campóo 
was obviously more interested in securing the 
holdings in Cilia Mayor than in fulfilling its spiritual 
duties. As to the deeds of the nuns of St. Felices of 
Avía, the easiest explanation is to assume a convent 
in dire financial straits and hoping, by the capture 
and burial of Ferrand Royz's body, to gain a share in 
the will. Indeed, as we know from the abundant 
documentation on these matters, one of the most 
common issues of contention between monastic 
orders and between secular and regular clergy was 
precisely the right to bury those whose descendants 
may prove to be grateful patrons. As far as we can 
reconstruct the holdings of Avía, they constituted a 
meager domain, spread in villages nearby the 
monastery. It was an uneasy lordship, often shared 
with far more powerful monasteries or unruly lords. If 
the Becerro, which reflects conditions twenty years 
later, is accurate, the income which the monastery 
obtained from this domain was quite small12. On the 
other hand, the Castañeda family held important 
lordships throughout the merindades of Old Castile 
and ties to the family may have proved beneficial to 
fledgling monastic institutions. Doña Mayor, herself, 
was still alive in the mid-fourteenth century and held 
rights in the villages of Ribas and Mansiella 
(Mansilla de Burgos); other members of the family, 
1 I. AHN. Clero, carp. 1670, no. 14 (6.1.1333); no. 15 
(29.1.1333). 
12. Becerro, [, 229-30, 238, 245, 319; II, 39. 
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above all Ruy Gonzalez de Castañeda, had extensive 
properties throughout the region13. One should also 
notice how long it took for justice to be rendered. In 
this particular case, it took almost four years after 
Ferrand Royz's death for the monks of Santa Maria la 
Real to secure the rights and income of Cilia Mayor. 
The story, however, ended well. Twenty years later the 
monastery still retained its jurisdiction over the 
village. Many other monasteries were not as fortunate 
in the troubled years of the mid-fourteenth century. 
Royal Violence 
The greatest scourge for both, the peasantry and 
small monastic institutions, was not always the 
random violence of magnates and noblemen. On the 
whole, as painfully intrusive as they were, magnate 
excesses were localized events — even though in the 
case of great families, such as the Haro, their power 
extended over a vast region. In many respects, what 
they took with one hand, they often either gave back 
or protected with the other. There was, after all, a limit 
to how much these noblemen could squeeze out of 
their peasants, or rob monasteries in which they 
wished to be buried. Moreover, they were not adverse 
to being bought. The numerous "prestamos", the 
granting of rights of lordship by a monastery to a lord 
for a lifetime without any obligation or rent, seems to 
indicate payments for services rendered, mostly 
protection, or bribes to prevent further violence. The 
systematic demands and abuses of royal officials, on 
the other hand, had an even deeper impact, for they 
undermined the last vestiges of law and created an 
atmosphere of selfish chaos in which small villages, 
monasteries and municipalities had to fend for 
themselves in often futile attempts to protect their lo-
cal interests at all costs. 
13. Idem, I, 218; II, 284. For Ruy Gonzalez de 
Castañedn see ¡, 113-15, 126-27, 131, 134, 137-40 ei 
passim. 
Beginning in the late thirteenth century, lhe list of 
protests, mostly from monasteries but also from 
municipalities, is almost endless. Again the bone of 
contention was the improper collection of taxes by 
royal agents and their disregard for exemptions or 
privileges. Clearly, the zealousness of bureaucrats in 
this period is certainly not peculiar to Castile. 
Elsewhere we turn in western medieval Europe, crown 
officials were energetically pushing the boundaries of 
royal jurisdiction with or without the direct 
encouragement of their kings. In Castile, however, the 
impression conveyed by the documents is one of 
royal officials seeking to extract as much as they 
could from their charges, while the crown did not 
have cither the proper information of or control over 
these actions. Again and again we witness royal 
ordinances and privileges confirmed by the king, 
while at the same time these same privileges were 
disregarded by rapacious royal officials. Inquests were 
ordered, money was spent, letters went back and 
forth, and, at the end, things remained very much the 
way they had always been. Monasteries and their 
dependent villagers were often victimized, and, as 
often, urban dwellers were deprived of their rights. 
This frantic struggle to get as much as possible 
from taxpayers with ever decreasing sources of 
income can be seen in three specific points of 
conflict between monasteries, municipalities and 
royal officials. They were: 1) the demands of the 
royal merinos for a monastic contribution of a mule 
and a silver cup; 2) the refusal of royal and muni-
cipal officials to pay the amounts assigned by the 
king to monasteries from the income of salt wells, 
or toll taxes; 3) lhe refusal by tax collectors to 
admit royal exemption from toll, customs, any 
other taxes and, above all, transhumance rights. 
Illegal taxation was often accompanied by forced 
expropriation of land and income, .imprisonment of 
dependents and confiscation or outright robbery of 
movable goods. 
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The monastic contributions of a mule and a silver 
cup 
In the early thirteenth century, the royal merinos 
had received an annual gift of a mule and a silver cup 
from monasteries. By the second half of the thirteenth 
century, many monasteries had been exempted from 
such payment and, eventually, the iegislation of the 
Cortes, at the petition of prelates, ended the 
contribution14. Yet for all these ordinances, the 
demands continued. In 1309 the Cistercian abbot of 
the monastery of Our Lady in Bujedo (diocese of 
Burgos) wrote to the king describing the condition of 
the monastery "pobre y menguado por fas guerras 
que passaron e los robos e por las tomas e muchos 
males que recibieron" (poor and diminished because 
of the wars just ended and the thefts, and 
appropriations which they [received] suffered), 
pleading for relief. Ferdinand IV exempted them from 
the payment of a mule and silver cup. In 1326 Alfon-
so XI confirmed this exemption; yet, in 1338, 
supposedly at the high point of Alfonso Xl's power, 
the merinos reales were still demanding the 
contribution and forcing the monastery of Our Lady 
of Bujedo to pay them the aforementioned items15. 
Earlier, in 1287, the abbot of San Pedro in Gumiel de 
14. Abuses dealing wjih illegal appropriations of 
acemitas (mu)cs) and excesses of merinos are banned in the 
ordinances of lhe Cortes, I, 189 (Valladolid, 1307), 219 
(Valladolid, 1312), 286-87 (Burgos, 1315); pelilions of ihc 
prelates against the exaction of mules and silver cups by the 
merinos mayores and the adelantados arc found in Cortes, 1, 
296-97 (Burgos, 1315) el passim. Royal exemptions of 
contribution of mules and silver cup to merinos were granted 
to the Benedictine, Cistercian and Premontre monasteries in 
1282 and 1312: Recueil, ed. Férotin, I, 272 (21.4.12S2) and 
p. 376 (12.3.1312). 
15. AHN Clero, carp. 171, no. 9 (25.3.1309), no. 10 
(18.4.1326), no. 12 (18.4.1338). In 1347, Alfonso XI 
reduced the payment of yantar to 200 mrs. annually, because 
the monastery was poor: AHN Clero, carp. 171, no. 13 
(26.2.1347). See also nos. 14, 15, 16 (20.2.1366 to 
15.11.1371). In lhe latier, the monastery was even 
exempted from the 200 mrs. 
Izán protested to Don Diego Lopez de Haro, 
adelantado mayor of Castile and a favorite of 
Sancho IV, that the merino real of Santo Domingo de 
Silos was demanding a mule, silver cup and 
purveyance in spite of the monastery's exemption. 
Thirteen years later, in the midst of a troubled 
minority, the situation had aggravated a great deal. 
By then, merinos, magnates, and other noblemen 
demanded mules and silver cups and, when refused, 
they took it by force1*. There are few monasteries, 
from one corner of Old Castile to the other, which did 
not voice similar protests over the illegal exaction of 
mules, silver cups and purveyance. Decade after 
decade, the kings ordered their officials to honor the 
exemption, but the protests show that royal official 
ignored the royal orders and continued their illegal 
practices. 
Other abuses against monasteries and cities. 
Refusal to allow for legal exemptions and denial of 
income 
In the same vein, from Avila to the Rioja, from 
Aguilar de Campóo to Siguenza, fonsadera and 
other taxes were collected illegally from the tenants 
of monasteries, and, we must also suppose, from 
those of noble lords too weak to prevent it17. Road 
16. AHN Clero, carp. 233 , no. 2 (12 .3 .1287) , no. 9 
(28.12.1300). 
17. Prótesis against the illegal collection of fonsadera can 
be found in lhe documentation of Oña. See, for example, 
Oña, 11, 748-49 (10.7.1275); AHN Clero, carp. 299, no. 10 
(26.3.1289); carp. 302, no. 18 (5.8.1296); carp. 306, no. 12 
(30.1.1309), no. 16 (2 .6 .1315) ; carp. 3 1 1 , no. 17 
(2.5.1339). Also see in Segovia , one dependant of the 
monastery of the Holy Cross in Segovia was excused of 
martiniega, bul tax collectors still demanded payment: AHN 
Clero, carp. 1963, no. 6 (29.9.1344). Sec also DMA, # 96 
(6.1.1272); ft 172 (10.7.1297); in Burgos, the bishop and the 
cathedr.il chapter often protested against lhe illicit attempts of 
royal officials to collect fonsadera and other taxes from 
which their dependents were exempted- See ACB vol. 78, f. 
2 (23.9.1288); vol. 17, f. 428 (10.12.1288); vol. 17, f. 433 
(25.1.1340) el passim. 
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tolls were also collected illegally for their goods; 
the rights and privileges held by monasteries and 
municipalities were often ignored. Thus, in 1345 Al-
fonso XI acknowledged that the cathedral of Burgos 
was exempted from paying portazgo, and that he 
( the king) had not respected these privi leges 
"because of his great [financial] need" ,s. 
Another way in which royal officials contributed 
to the state of violence and financial breakdown of 
Iherealm was by refusing to pay royal grants in either 
issue or kind to monasteries, or by demanding taxes 
above the amount agreed between crown and the 
ecclesiastical or municipal institutions. Thus, the royal 
officials at Salinas de Anana, in spite of Alfonso XFs 
orders , refused to pay the monies due to the 
monastery of Our Lady in Herrera in 1332 and 1333. 
Eight years later, after a long and taxing inquest, the 
monks of Herrera had not been able to collect their 
rightful dues1''. In 1336 Alfonso XI wrote to Ferrando 
Pérez de Porto Carrero, the merino mayor in Castile, 
ordering him not to allow royal officials to demand 
more than 150 mrs. in purveyance from the monks of 
Our Lady of Rioscco, nor to imprison the monasteries 
vassals as a mean of forcing payment20. Further east, 
in (he region of Campóo, the nuns of San Andrés de 
Arroyo had been granted a miserly 36 mrs. per week 
from the portazgo of AQUÌÌHT de Campóo. Already by 
1291 they complained that they were not receiving any 
of the money. In spite of numerous complaints and 
royal letters to the effect, for the next half a century 
the abbess and the monastery were not very successful 
in enforcing their rights. In 1326, 1327, 1330, 1332, 
after long and costly litigations and inquests, the 
18. ACB vol. 2, pari 2, f. 39 (20-V-1345) . Other 
examples of violation of exemptions from portazgo can be 
found in ACB vol. 78, f. 2 (23.9.1288); AHN Clero, carp. 
299 , no. 12 (12.4.1289); carp. 307, no. 19 (6.6.1315) el 
passim. 
19. AHN Clero, carp. 2 4 1 , no. 12 (12.8 .1332) ; carp. 
241 , no. 15 4.5.1333); carp. 242, no. 13 (25.5.1341). 
20. AHN Clero, carp. 355, no. 12 (1.5.1336). 
abbess of San Andrés still pleaded for lhe payment of 
their share of the portazgo of Aguilar, long in arrears21. 
For all the pious protestations of Alfonso XI or his 
energetic letters to municipal or royal officials, little 
was changed. 
In Avila,-in 1272 and later in 1296, lhe royal 
officials sought to collect taxes from the bishop's 
vassals in the villages Santa María de Mesegar, San 
Bartolomé and Malpartida although the peasants* 
obligations were to the bishop and not to lhe crown. 
In 1286, Blasco Blázquez, a royal official, attempted 
to exact payment for fonsadera from the parents of 
the forty servants of the cathedral canons, who had 
been exempted just a few years earlier by the king. In 
1297, Ferdinand IV demanded 600 mrs. from the 
bishop of Avila for purveyance, though he had been 
granted relief from this obligation by previous kings. 
After, an inquest which lasted almost eight months at 
considerable cost, the king recognized that he did 
not have the right to demand yantar from the church 
of Avila22. Nor were the kings of Castile above direct 
extortion. In 1349, Alfonso XI demanded from the 
church of Avila a free and voluntary contribution to 
the siege of Gibraltar, "because the income of his 
lordship was not enough". When all the money was 
not forthcoming, he ordered the alcaldes of the city 
to confiscate church property up to the amount 
required to complete the quantity required and to 
sell it to the "five or six or ten richest men in the 
town or villages where the properties were located 
2 1 . The originnl donation of 300 mrs. annually was 
granted by Alfonso X: AHN Clero, carp. 1731, no. 10 
(13.3.1256). Protests against the refusal to pay by royal and 
municipal officials and decisions of the alcaldes of Aguitnr 
granting the 36 mrs. per week in AHN Clero, carp. 1733, no. 
3 (7.1.1326), no. 4 (9.1.1326). A long inquest was recorded 
in AHN Clero 1733, no. 9 (10.2.1327). Also no. 15 
(15.1.1330); carp. 1734, no. 2 (24.5.1332). 
22. DMA, pp. 86, 162-163, 118-1 19 (1286), 168-169. 
See also AHN. Clero, carp. 28, no. 9 (23.12.1337): one of 
the vassals of the bishop of Avila had been extorted payment 
regardless of her exemption. 
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{Colección de Alfonso XI, pp. 595-597). Nor was 
this an isolated event. In the 1340s, as the need for 
income grew and the resources decreased, Alfonso XI 
often resorted to this form of financial pressure. 
We witness, thus, two types of arbitrary exactions 
by royal officials: those who circumvented or 
ignored royal exemptions, seeking to increase fiscal 
intake as well as fatten their own pockets, and when 
special circumstances or simple greed prompted the 
crown to demand money illegally. But Alfonso XI, 
in the 1340s, only followed on patterns of extortion 
established by his ancestors. In 1283, the Infante 
Don Sancho confiscated the property of Juan Garcia 
de Covarrubias. This action resulted from Juan 
Garci'a's support for Alfonso X during the conflict 
between the king and his son, as well as Sancho's 
need for money. Soon afterwards, the Infante forced 
the twelve richest men in Covarrubias to purchase 
the confiscated lands and to pay the purchase price 
to him {Fuentes de Castilla II, p. 126, 14.6J281). 
Although the examples are numerous and cut across 
the width of Castile, the extant documentation of 
San Salvador de Oña, a monastery north of Burgos, 
provide one of the most revealing examples of these 
illegal demands, and the problems which 
ecclesiastical institutions and its tenants faced 
under excessive and illegal demands. 
The Case of Oña 
In 1285, Sancho IV confirmed Alfonso X's letter 
forbidding noblemen in the region of Oña to 
purchase property from the monastery's vassals. 
This was often followed by their refusal to pay dues 
to their theoretical overlord and the subsequent loss 
of income for the monastery23. This was a long-
standing problem, already addressed by Alfonso X, 
as indicated above, and which also plagued 
23. AHN. Clero, carp. 297, no. 1 (11.4.1285). 
monasteries, cathedral chapters and secular clergy 
throughout Castile. Although not an example of 
illegal demands, the erosion of ecclesiastical 
domains, through the purchase by magnates, made 
the violation of fiscal exemptions even more painful. 
In 1300, 1329, 1338 and 1351, the abbots of Oña 
complained bitterly against these purchases. In the 
last instance, urban oligarchs were also actively 
buying lands from vassals of Oña and then refusing 
to pay infùrción to the monastery. The abbot 
complained that because of these actions the land 
became yerma24. More seriously, however, were the 
frequent incursions of magnates and their retinues. 
They entered the lands of San Salvador, robbed, 
burned and sometimes even confiscated outright 
monastic lands. These were common events, which, 
as the extant documentation shows, occurred 
throughout most of the century after 1248 and even 
in years which were supposedly/peaceful. In 1338, 
the abbot and monks of Oña protested to Ferrant 
Pérez de Porto Carrero, merino mayor of Castile, that 
the magnates, noblemen and townspeople of the 
region were "fencing the monastery's meadows, 
cutting their trees, hunting their partridges, fishing 
their salmons and trouts"25. 
Yet, how could the royal officials or even direct 
appeals to the kings in this period be of any use, 
when royal officials and even direct overlords could 
also be charged with the same excesses. Royal 
officials, Lope Diaz de Haro and his agents and 
before him his father, Don Diego of Haro,~took 
yantar (purveyance) by force from the monastery 
and from the monasteries vassals26. The collectors of 
the fonsadera, again and again, exacted the tax, 
often by force, from helpless villagers under the 
24. AHN. Clero, carp. 303, no. 21 (11.6.1300); carp. 
310, no. 3 (15.8.1329); carp. 31 1, no. 13 (5.12.1338); carp. 
313, no. 8 (27.6.1351). 
25. AHN. Clero, carp. 311, no. 11 (7.9.1338). 
26. Oña, pp. 556, 583, 698-99, 722-23 et passim. 
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jurisdiction of Oña throughout the century after 
124S. Inquests to remedy these abuses were 
undertaken and such practices forbidden, but little 
changed37. In the same vein, the collectors of gate 
tolls (portazgó) exacted as much as they could from 
the monks of Oña, even though they had enjoyed 
exemption from those taxes for more than a century2". 
Regardless of royal letters confirming their privileged 
status, nothing was gained. The administrators and 
farmer of the salt wells (Salinas de Rosío), where San 
Salvador dc Ona had been granted 300 mrs. annually 
in 1239 (which were lhe equivalent of 1,800 mrs. in 
the early fourteenth century) and 412 almudes of salt, 
refused to pay the amount in full as they did in 1292, 
or refused to give anything at all as they did in 1309 
and 13142". In 1332, the collectors of the purveyance 
in Laredo took by force 100 mrs. from Oña's 
dependency of San Pelayo de Ceserà and 200 mrs. 
from its vassals. Alfonso XI's admonitions to his 
official did not include, however, an order to return 
the monies3". 
In 1312, Ferdinand IV wrote to Ferrant Royz de 
Saldaña, adelantado mayor in Castile, regarding 
complaints of the abbot of San Salvador de Oña. The 
castellans of the royal fortress at Frías (a few 
kilometers down the road from Oña and an 
important commercial link between Burgos and the 
ports of the Bay of Biscay) stole clothes, fire wood 
and meat from the vassals of the monastery, who 
27. Oña, II, 631-32; J. José García, Fuentes medievales 
castcllano-iconcsas, F. Javier Peña, el al, cds. T\venly volu-
mes published of a projected one hundred and three {Burgos, 
Ediciones J.M. Garrido Garrido, 1983- ) (hereafter FMCL), 
4, 86-87 (26 .3 .1289) , 210-12 (24.6 .1294) , 241-42 
(5.8.1296); AHN. Clero, carp. 3 1 1 , no. 6 (13.5.1337) et 
passim. 
28. Oña, II, 700-01, 781-82; FMCL, 4, 90-91 
(20.4.1289), 134-35 (14.1.1292) et passim. 
29. Oña, II, 489, 642-50; FMCL, 4, 136 (1292), 239 
(1296); AHN. Clero, carp. 306, no. 11 (30.1.1309); carp. 
307, no. 13 (12.7.1314). 
30. AHN. Clero, carp. 310, no. 8 (11.1.1332); no. 9 
(20.8.1332). 
because of these deeds were poor. A royal inquiry 
undertaken by Diego Pérez, alcalde of the king in 
Frías, and Lope Ruiz de Frías found the charges to be 
truth, and the king, therefore, forbade the castellans 
from continuing such abuses. Yet, three years 
afterwards, Alfonso XI, or his tutors, had to reissue 
Ferdinand IV's admonitions, showing the 
independence of royal officials from the crown's 
authority - each of them seeking to further his own 
ends and fortune31. The burdensome repetition of 
monastic complaints about official extortion and 
royal inaction does not provide the sense of 
immediacy and crisis which specific events do. 
What this official violence meant for San Salvador 
de Oña in terms of rents cannot be calculated, but wc 
can sec the impact in terms of day to day life. In 
1307, the abbot and monks of Oña complained to 
the king that their house in San Martin of 
Montenegro, which was rented to two good men and 
exempted from taxation by ancient privileges, was 
in danger of becoming vacant because of illegal tax 
demands. Although the possibility exists that these 
might have been land abandoned because of more 
attractive offers elsewhere, with the abandonment 
blamed on taxes or the excesses of royal agents, 
according to the monks no one wished to rent the 
property if, in addition to the customary 
contributions to monastery, they also had to satisfy 
the demands of royal officials. Ferdinand IV ordered 
an investigation which showed that the property 
was rightfully exempted; therefore, the king ordered 
his financial agents to cease demanding taxes. Yet, 
in 1318, two royal letters show that nothing had 
changed and that according to the abbot "no one 
wished to rent the land."32. Not unlike three 
31. AHN. Clem, carp. 307, no. 5 (4.7.1312 in a copy of 
19.1.1364); no. 20 (20.7.1315). 
32. AHN. Clero, carp. 306, no. I (16.4.1307 in a copy 
of 10.9.1307); carp. 308, no. 7 (127 .1318) , no. 8 
(24.7.1318). 
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cerfturics afterwards, excessive taxation - most of it 
illegal - was slowly but inexorably crushing the 
northern Castilian peasantry. As shall be seen below, 
not different from the late sixteenth century, the 
peasants were voting with their feet. 
Fiscal oppression of municipalities 
The fiscal oppression was not limited to 
ecclesiastical institutions already on the decline 
because of changing economic conditions and a 
decrease in gifts from the laity; it also affected 
powerful municipal councils, such as Burgos and 
Cuéllar. In a previous chapter we have seen the. 
conflicts over taxation and other matters erupting 
between the council of the town of Santo Domingo 
de Silos and its monastic overlord, and between 
townsmen and royal officials. Here we could see the 
bind in which municipal authorities found 
themselves when faced.with official rapacity. 
In the late 1270s Burgos was fined heavily for 
allowing money lenders to operate in the city and to 
collect usurious rate for their services. In 1278, the 
Infante Sancho had ordered two "good men" of 
Burgos to accompany royal officials conducting an 
inquiry into this matter. Once the municipal council 
was found guilty, Alfonso X imposed a fine of 60,000 
mrs. on those lending money in the Burgos at 
usurious rates. As one of Sancho's letters implies, 
these money lenders were Christians "endangering 
their soul because of the sin of usury", they were 
also the leading citizens of Burgos. Therefore, the 
city became responsible for making good on the 
fine. Sixty thousand mrs. was a rather stiff sum, but 
the Christian money lenders could have considered 
it an inevitable overhead in what was a very 
profitable enterprise. With interest rates of at least 
33%, the expense could be passed on to the 
unfortunate borrowers. 
At this juncture, however, things became a bit 
complicated. Alfonso X and the Infante don Sancho 
were, by then, struggling over the rights of 
succession. Alfonso advanced the claims of his 
grandson, the Infante of La Cerda, and Sancho his 
own rights to the throne. In need of money and men 
to promote their own causes, they both sought to 
collect the fine from Burgos. Alfonso X delegated 
this task on Aparicio Guillen, a Burgalese citizen 
and member of the ruling elite, and on Don Zag, the 
Jew of Don Manuel. The Infante don Sancho, in turn, 
assigned Miguel de Sevilla and the abbot of San Pe-
dro de Cárdena, an important monastery 10 
kilometers from Burgos, as his agents. Although the 
terms of the agreement are not clear, the Burgalese 
municipal authorities struck a bargain with the In-
fante whose cause they supported! An installment of 
40,000 mrs. was to be paid on 1st August 1278 and 
the other 20,000 mrs. by the feast of St. Martin33. 
Sancho's letter of 28 July 1278 reveals his 
pressing need for the money to pay his knights and 
of the use of the fine's income in the campaign to 
maintain his right to the throne. Meanwhile, Alfon-
so X kept pressing Burgos for prompt payment of 
the fine to his own agents and forbidding the 
council of the city to make any payments to the In-
fante Sancho. In mid-August, Alfonso X's man, 
Bernard of Centellas, came to Burgos to collect 20,000 
mrs. of the 60,000 mrs. fine for Michaelmas, but as we 
have seen above, Sancho had already received a 
commitment to that money, plus an initial payment 
of 40,000 mrs. half a month earlier. With Sancho's 
support, Burgos resisted Bernard's demands. Thus, 
the king made new and futile claims to the money in 
late September 1278, finally ordering an inquiry 
into the whole affair in February 1279. By then, 
33. On the conflicis between Sancho and Alfonso X over 
lhe usury fines see BALLESTEROS, 1946, pp. 93-194; AMB 
clasif. 2560 (14.5.1278); clasif. 2561 (15.7.1278); clasif. 
2562 (16.7.1278); clasif. 2564 ( IS.7 .1278) , clasif. 2563 
(28.7.1278). ; 
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Sancho had received the full amount of the fine, and 
there was nothing left for his father and enemy34. 
As if having the king and the Infante make 
conflicting claims on the city resources was not 
enough, shortly after Martinmas, the council of 
Burgos had to appeal to the Infante since his fine 
collectors continued to demand money even after 
the fine had been paid in tote?5. Similarly, in 1284, 
after Sancho had promised remission of taxes to the 
city councils which had been loyal to him during his 
conflict with Alfonso X, Pedro Diaz and Muño Díaz, 
Sancho's tax collectors, attempted to exact 30,000 
mrs. in fonsadera from Burgos although the city had 
been exempted from that tax since the twelfth 
century3*. 
Royal demands could be irksome and a burden 
for most municipali t ies; they did not need to 
involve such substantial amounts as the 60,000 mrs. 
in fines paid by Burgos. Beginning in 1340, the city 
council of Cuéllar and the crown engaged in a 
protracted dispute over the illegal collection of ta-
xes. At stake was the paltry sum of 360 mrs. or the 
equivalent of the fonsadera obligation of twelve 
men. On 20 February of that year, one of Alfonso X's 
officials, López Ferrández, informed the concejo of 
Cuéllar th'at it should pay the fonsadera, amounting 
to 40,000 mrs. to Juan González de Roa, one of the 
king's crossbowmen and to Ferrán Pérez de Saldaña, 
both king's men in the dioceses of Segovia 
{Colección de Cuéllar, 93: 20.2.1340). 
Several months later, in September 1340, the tax 
34. AMB clasif. 2566 (30 .7 .1278) ; ciasif. 2567 
(8.8.127S); clasif. 2912 (14.8.1278); clasif. (22.9.1278); 
clasif. 2571 (16.10.1278); clasif. 2572 (20.2.1279). 
35. AMB clasif. 2569 (6.10.1278): "Pesquisidores que 
era en ssu logar por mi en rracon de las usuras por scssaenla 
mîll mrs délos dineros blancos de la guerra que me dieron" 
(emphasis mine, that they had already given me). Sancho 
ordered that the property or monies taken over the agreed 
sum should be returned. 
36. AMB clasif. 2935 (8.3.1284). 
had not yet been fully collected, and two new 
officials, Alfonso Pérez and Blasco Ferrández de 
Medina del Campo, were assigned to receive the 
monies from the tax farmers (the payment of the 
fonsadera had, in fact, being farmed by the city 
council itself). By 7 November, the concejo de 
Cuéllar at a public meeting made a partial payment 
of 18,000 mrs., hoping that they had fulfilled their 
obligations for the moment. Obviously, the tax 
farmers and collectors in the jurisdiction of Cucllar 
were members of the town council, had profited from 
collecting the tax and were themselves, most 
probably, exempted from it. Five days after Cuéllar 
had formally paid its taxes to Alfonso Pérez de 
Medina del Campo, the king demanded an 
additional 360 mrs. in fonsadera from the twelve 
pecheros of Pedro Ferrández. Gonzalo García, García 
Royz, Juan González and Rodrigo Sánchez had 
been the actual collectors of the tax and, as their 
answer to the king implied, were members of 
Cuéllar's concejo as well. They protested that the 
king had previously exempted the twelve men of 
Pedro Ferrández, scribe of Cuéllar37. 
In early January 1341 the dispute was still going 
on, but a long settlement on the 15th of the month 
seemed to have resolved the issue once and for all. 
Yet, in 1346 the king was still claiming the 360 mrs. 
which had not been paid in the fonsadera of 1340. 
That year, he sent his crossbowman, Johan Desco!, 
to collect the aforementioned sum. On 14 May 
1346, the king's envoy met in an open square with 
the town officials and most citizens of the town. The 
citizens of Cuéllar bowed to the kings* demand, but 
did not pay immediately because of the absence of 
many of the knights and squires of Cucllar, gone to 
the tasks of the transhumance. It "was late", as the 
document states, and the flocks and many men of 
Cuéllar were most probably on their way to the 
37. Ibidem., # 98 (12.11.1340), # 99 (15.11.1340). 
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summer pasture lands. A month later, however, a 
representative of the town traveled to the royal court 
to argue in front of the king that the town council 
did not owe 360 mrs., since Alfonso XI, himself, had 
exempted the twelve pecheros. At the end, the king 
relented and "forgave" Cuéllar its debt3". 
Unlike previous examples, in this instance the 
concejo was able to defend its privilege, or should 
wc say, the privileges of its ruling elite. But at what 
cost! To defend themselves from the illegal 
collection of 360 mrs. in 1340, the citizens of 
Cuéllar had to litigate for six years, to send a 
procurator to the royal court, to bear the burden and 
threats of several visits by armed royal agents, to 
draw several legal instruments and to call 
extraordinary meetings of its council. Even when 
succeeding in resisting illegal fiscal demands, 
Cuéllar's victory was, by all accounts, a Pyrrhic one. 
The cure was far more expensive than the sickness. 
Noble Violence 
As wc look across the plains of Castile, the 
burden of taxation and illegal royal demands in this 
period was a vivid example of the ills plaguing 
Castilian society. It was, at the same time, a 
manifestation and a reason for most of its economic 
upheavals. As the sources of income diminished 
because of bad weather, demographic decline and 
sheer mismanagement, the pressure on available 
sources of revenue increased. Tax resistance, 
sometimes to the point of armed confrontation, and 
tax collection often, as has been seen, carried by for-
ce became the stuff of everyday life in late medieval 
Castile. 
Alfonso XI's forceful attempts to impose his will 
over a rebellious nobility and a cantankerous 
3S. ibidem, ft 100 (15.1.1341), ft 103 (20.2.1346), ft 
104 (14.5.1346), ft 106 (11.6.1346). 
municipalities did not really solve the basic problem 
of lawlessness. His successes, which are worth 
highlighting, must stand in contrast to the reality of 
daily life. On the eve of the Plague, Castile, in spite 
of Alfonso XI's policies, was a realm on the edge of 
doom and chaos. As-we look at specific examples of 
this slow process of disintegration, we must do so in 
the context of the previous pages. I am now far more 
convinced of my previous assertion: that the 
heightening level of violence was the result of the 
decline in royal, ecclesiastical and seigniorial rents, 
and that was, in itself, the consequence of the deep 
economic and demographic transformation of the 
realm which took place in the mid-thirteenth 
century and afterward. 
Let us begin by looking at the region of the 
Rioja over a period of time. Although the extant 
documentation is not as extensive as in other areas 
of northern Castile, it probably contains more 
accounts of disturbances and signs of the existing 
problems than sources anywhere else. In many 
respects, although a fairly rich region with an 
important wine production and on the main 
commercial network of Castile, the area around 
Logroño, Santo Domingo de la Calzada and Nájera 
suffered from its geographical location. Its proximity 
to the frontier with Aragón and Navarre forced a 
larger military presence than it was desirable or, for 
that matter, healthy. To the north, the Basque regions 
had long been the focus of rebellious nobles, and 
their excesses there were probably unmatched by 
those of other areas of Old Castile. Às we have seen 
before, Logroño had a long running feud with 
Victoria over the distribution of its wine. Moreover, 
by the early fourteenth century the re-routing of the 
pilgrimage route through the San Andrés pass also 
affected adversely the economy of the Rioja. 
A few examples from the area will suffice. The 
villages and lands around the monastery of Santa 
Maria la Real de Nájera had been troubled by the 
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same misfortunes plaguing the rest of Cast i le. 
Already in the 1270s and afterwards, those holding 
the rents of the salt wel ls in Anana refused the 
rightful portion of salt to the monks. Moreover we 
also f ind the usual disputes over woods, payments 
of t i thes and se ign ior ia l r ights w i th other 
monaster ies, their own vassals and munic ipa l 
corporations. It did not help, of course, that the 
powerful Haro family ruled in the area. There is every 
indication that in lhe late thirteenth century Diego 
López de Haro had taken the village of Covacardiel 
from Santa Maria la Real, which the monastery had 
held for more than a century. That he agreed to return 
it to the monks on his death, did not make-up for the 
loss of income3,J. 
Throughout the period, the monks had a running 
feud wi th the town council of Nájera. The town's 
officials did not allow the monastery to bring their 
own wine into Nájera, even i f it was for their own 
use, or to store it there without a fee. In spite of the 
monks complaints and the admoni t ions o f the 
Castil ian kings, the city council sti l l continued to 
make trouble4". 
In 1315, Alfonso X I or his tutors agreed to lower 
the number of tax payers in the localities of Ventosa 
and Besares in 1315, because of the wars and the 
accompanying depopulation. Eleven years later, 
cond i t i ons had worsened. In 1326, Sancho 
Ferrández de Greda, tax collector in the area of Ven-
tosa, went to the village and found it "deserted and 
gone to waste, its inhabi tants hav ing f l ed to 
Navarre". The 1315 assessment of 10 pecheros was 
retained although if there was no one there, it is hard 
39. A H N . Códices. 106B, f. 33 (8.7.1282), IT37-39 
(1.8.1282, 8.4.1285); AHN- Clero, carp. 1032, no. 4 
(10.2.1270), no. 6 (16.5.1270), no. 16 (4.3.129S). 
40. AHN. Códices. 106B, ff. 87-8Sa; AHN. Clero, carp. 
1032, no. 9 (26.10.1272), no. 19 (12.3.1304), no. 20 
(12.3.1304). In the last document, the concejo forbade the 
monastery to bring wax as well as wine into the town without 
paying appropriate dues. 
to imagine who would pay the tax'". Indeed, these 
were exactly the conditions which led many small 
villages, around Nájera, Santa Domingo de la Calzada 
and Logroño (and where the villagers chose to 
remain), to build walls and ramparts and which, 
when assaulted by the unruly local lords, brought 
the municipal mi l i t ia o f Logroño to wage war 
against the nobility. 
On 20 December 1323, twelve neighbors of San-
ta Colonia, inc lud ing the vi l lage's priest and 
blacksmith, in their name and that of the council, 
swore and recognized that they were the vassals of 
the monastery of Santa María de Nájera. They also 
agreed to build a wall around the village and not to 
sell, pawn, exchange or, in any other form, alienate 
any of their properties to any noblemen, nun, or 
anyone else except to other good men of Santa 
Coloma. They also promised to prevent anyone, 
with the exception of the prior of the monastery, to 
bui ld a strong house or tower in the v i l lage. 
Moreover, the peasants were responsible for the 
expense of building the wal l or ramparts, for the 
gates and lock as well as for the maintenance and 
defense of the fortifications. In 1338, Alfonso XI 
wrote to his merinos ordering them to prevent the 
wall of Santa Coloma from being torn down. The 
violence perpetrated in the region by the rebellious 
Don Juan Manuel and Don Juan Núñez and the wars 
against Aragón and Navarre threatened Santa 
Coloma, but it is clear that defending the town 
depended, to a large extent, on the efforts of the 
peasants themselves and of the few artisans in the 
locality"2. 
41. AHN. Clero, carp. 1033, no. 6 (26.5.1326). 
42. AHN. Clero, carp. 1033, no. 5 (20.12.1323), no. 15 
(4.12.1338). In 1363 the prior of Sania María de Nííjera took 
possession of Santa Coloma from the city council of 
Logroño which held it as security for a loan of 15,000 mrs: 
carp. 1033, no. 20 (12.1 1.1363). 
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Other villages were placed in similar situation. 
In 1314, the villagers of Lcza also recognized 
themselves as vassals of Santa Maria of Nãjcra and 
promised not to allow noblemen to purchase 
property in their village. As those of Santa Coloma 
had done, they began to build a wall and a strong 
house. Four years later in 1318, the prior of Santa 
Maria exempted those of Covacardiel from dues for 
six years in return for their building of a wall and 
agreeing to defend the town. Covacardiel and the 
nearby town of Villa Almondar had their share of 
difficulties with the monastery and had been forced 
to request a definition of the monastery's seigniorial 
rights. Clearly, both these villages must have had 
some economic importance and commercial life, 
since in 1285 their procurators complained to the 
king against the abuses which the magnates 
inflicted upon the villagers, and the king exempted 
them from portazgo in the region between the Duero 
River and the ports of the Bay of Biscay"13. 
While small and unimportant villages, such as 
Santa Coloma, or more populous and economic 
viable ones, as Covacardiel and Villa Almondar, 
seemed to have weathered the stormy first half of the 
fourteenth century, others were not as fortunate in 
the period of Alfonso Xl's minority. A royal charter 
of 1316, drawn by Alfonso Xl's tutors, reveals the 
real pain and effects of aristocratic violence on the 
peasantry. The prior of Santa María de Nájera 
requested from the king a ten year remission from all 
taxes for his vassals in Oriemo. The peasants of 
Oriemo had inhabited the village of Ribafrecha until 
around late in 1315 or early 1316 when the village 
was sacked by John Ferrández de Bezla, a magnate, 
and his retinue. They burned the village, stole the 
property and destroyed the crops and gardens. 
43 . For Leza see AHN. Códices, 106B, ff. 113-20a 
(S.10,1314). For Covacardiel and Villa Almondar: AHN. 
Códices 106B, f. 39 (8.4.1285), ff. 133-35a (23.6.131S). 
Also AHN. Clero, carp. 1032, no. 4 (10.2.1270). 
Ribafrecha had a strong house, which was now 
occupied by John Ferrández. That year, John Alfon-
so de Haro, a powerful magnate, together with the 
municipal militias of Logroño, laid siege to John 
Ferrández's forces. The village and the land around it 
were "desolate" and "yerma", and Santa Maria's 
vassals had moved elsewhere and founded a new 
village at Oriemo. The regents agreed to exempt the 
villagers in Oriemo from all taxes for 10 years, 
except moneda forera, every 7 years44. 
The same day as the previous royal charter, 20 
April 1316, Alfonso XI also granted authorization 
to the peasants of Oriemo to build a wall in their new 
village, forbidding nobleman to settle there. 
Although the stronghold of Ribafrecha had not 
prevented the attack of rebellious magnates, the 
crown, Oriemo's lord, the prior of Santa Maria, and 
the peasants themselves saw the building of walls 
and the exclusion of the nobility as the only hope of 
survival. This, however, did not occur until 1323, 
when fourteen men of Oriemo, for themselves and for 
the village council, recognized the lordship of the 
monastery, and promised to build a wall at their own 
cost, with the other usual obligations of not 
allowing/ï/osi/a/go or other nobleman into Oriemo45. 
The fate of Leza 
Even those vil lages which escaped the 
turbulence of Alfonso Xl's minority were not spared 
later evils. The minutes of a series of meetings of the 
concejo of Logroño, held in the town and in the 
village of Leza from 11 to 16 May 1334, serve as a 
vivid reminder that Alfonso Xl's restoration of order 
was little more than a mirage. The account, 
preserved among the extant documents of Santa 
María de Nájera, records one of those events in me-
44. AHN. Códices, 106B, ff. 125-27a (20.4.1316). 
45. AHN. Códices, 106B, ff. 125-27 (20.4 .1316) , ff. 
139-45 (23.1.1323). 
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dieval life, both urban and rural, which may not 
have been uncommon in late medieval Castile. On 
early evening, Wednesday 6 May 1334, the town 
crier of Logroño "as was the use and custom" 
walked through the streets of the city, calling all the 
citizens to a meeting of the council to be held two 
days afterwards at the cemetery of the church of St. 
James. The choice of the cemetery as a place for the 
gathering as well as the numerous witnesses, almost 
all of them citizens of Logroño, named in the 
document points to the popular character of the 
convocation. Shopkeepers, shoemakers, blacksmiths 
and municipal officials were in attendance. On 11 
May, Don Loys, prior of Santa María de Nájera, 
addressed the meeting and requested that a letter of 
Alfonso XI to the municipal officials of Logroño (of 
20 April 1334) be read to those gathered there. In the 
letter, the king answered the complaints of the prior 
and his request for restitution of the hamlet or 
village of Lcza. 
The story unfolded as follows: Don John Alfon-
so de Haro, whom wc had met before fighting by the 
side of Logroño's militia, had taken by force the 
logar (hamlet, place) of Leza; he had also occupied 
what must have been, by then, the deserted place of 
Ribafrccha, overturning, in the latter place, the 
remains of the existing wall. After refurbishing 
Leza's fortifications, John Alfonso and his men used 
it as a base of operations to raid and scourge the 
surrounding countryside. The concejo of Logroño, 
affected by these events, called its militia, marched 
on Leza and took it by force of arms from John Al-
fonso de Haro and his company. Following the cap-
ture of Leza, Logroño's officials gave Leza to 
Gonzalo Iváñez de Bastan, a knight and vassal of 
the king, but not without requiring him first to do 
homage to the town authorities for Leza and to swear 
to keep the hamlet in Logroño's service4". 
Supported by the king's letter, the prior now 
requested the restitution of Leza to the monastery's 
lordship. The citizens of Logroño argued that they 
had taken Leza from John Alfonso and not from the 
monastery and wished to wait for the king's decision 
on this matter. Obviously, the city council of 
Logroño either did not trust the monastery to keep 
Lcza safe from magnate violence, or saw this as an 
opportunity to extend its own jurisdiction into the 
surrounding countryside. Thus, rather than 
complying with don Loys petition, the town 
officials promised to send procurators to the royal 
court to inquiry into the matter. 
Two days afterwards, 13 May, the prior met again 
with the council officials and other citizens of 
Logroño at the cemetery and petitioned anew for 
the return of Leza. Continuing to procrastinate, the 
men from Logroño argued that they had given Leza 
to Gonzalo Iváñez to hold it in the name of the king 
and of the town. Since Gonzalo was not present, 
they could not reach a decision; therefore, he was 
called to Logroño as a prerequisite for any decision. 
On Saturday 14 May, the prior met with the town's 
officials and, after a re-reading of Alfonso XI's letter 
and in the presence of Gonzalo Iváñez de Bastan, the 
concejo finally ordered the restitution of Leza to the 
monastery. Clearly, a compromise had been reached 
in the intervening hours, since the prior agreed to 
take the village back but to plan its defense with the 
advice of "the good men" of the town of Logroño47. 
Later the same day, the prior and the town 
officials met anew in the house of the council. The 
municipal authorities of Logroño wished to know in 
detail what plans the prior had for holding Leza 
against the magnates and from preventing it from 
becoming an outpost for magnate violence once 
again. The prior recognized that Leza did not 
produce enough income to support an armed 
46. AHN. Códices 106B, ff. 187-205a (11.5.1334). 47. Ibidem. 
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contingent strong enough to deter magnate 
incursions. Was it perhaps prudent to destroy the 
wall, and thus remove the temptation of using Leza as 
a strategic stronghold? The officials of Logroño 
doubted the wisdom of such action, and thought it 
would not be in the king's service. 
On Monday 16 May, the prior, the members of 
the council of Logroño, Gonzalo Iváñez and the 
council and the good men of Leza met first within 
the walls of Leza and, later in the day, outside the 
hamlet. At the petition of Gonzalo Iváñez, the prior 
forgave the men of Leza for transferring their 
allegiance to John Alfonso and later to Gonzalo 
Iváñez, and, afterwards, he received the villagers 
renewed pledge of vassalage and promise of 
defending the village against attacks by the 
nobility48. 
In this short vignette is the kernel of the history 
of northern Castile in the first half of the fourteenth 
century. Wanton violence by the nobility was often 
met unsuccessfully by rudimentary attempts at 
surrounding mere hamlets with walls. Monasteries 
and city councils argued and litigated over 
decreasing sources of income, calling on a distant 
and not too effective king to favor one or the other 
side. The peasants shifted allegiances the best they 
could in an effort to survive. We must also attempt 
to understand the implications of these defense 
agreements within the context of the times and of 
events elsewhere in the medieval West. The extant 
sources do not spell out what types of wall the 
villagers of Covacardiel, Ribafrecha, Oriemo, and 
Leza built. These villages must not have exceeded 
one hundred ¡nhabitants3 including women and 
children, and it is hard to imagine they had cither 
the manpower or the wherewithal for such 
enterprises. On the other hand, the walls were not 
just ditches around the hamlet or earth ramparts. The 
48. Ibidem. 
documents mention gates and locks and strong 
houses within the wall, all of them made of stone. 
Since wood was sparse throughout most of Castile 
and stones often plentiful, one could envision low 
walls of mud and stone with wood gates and iron 
locks - the prior or a man assigned by him was 
always to keep the key to the gate. 
These examples, however, come from fiercely 
disputed frontier areas or strategically located 
places. In the area of the Rioja, although close to the 
Navarrese and Aragonese borders, the building of 
walls was not a response to external threats but 
rather to localized internal violence, nor does it seem 
that any of the aforementioned hamlets were in 
strategic locations or saw its fortunes improved by 
the construction of walls. Instead, the contrary took 
place, and the villages or hamlets became the target 
for the attacks of magnates and their retinue, 
seeking to gain strong places from which to 
undertake their criminal activities or to remove 
them as threats tQ their power. 
The Impact of Violence in Late Medieval 
Northern Castile: the Case of Matute 
The evidence from the Rioja and from other 
parts of northern Castile also reveal the topsy turvy 
nature of Castilian lordship and the ambivalent 
relationship between lords and peasants. In the mid-
fourteenth century, regardless of how much writers 
such as the Infante Don Juan Manuel - himself 
guilty of untold violence - placed on the traditional 
hierarchy of society, in Castile the theoretical 
divisions of medieval people into those who pray, 
those who work and those who fight, counted for 
very little. The peasants of Covacardiel, Leza, 
Oriemo and other hamlets of northern Castile were 
not reluctant to take arms and to defend their 
property. This was certainly not the response of a 
frontier society (many of these villagers had been for 
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centuries in the rearguard of the frontier with Islam), 
nor was it a momentary and unexpected explosion 
of peasant's wrath provoked by the havoc of war, as 
has been the case in France during the Jacquerie or 
in England in 1381. Many of the Castilian peasants 
had planned and worked on defense projects for 
more than a decade. 
The language of the defensive agreements 
between monasteries and their vassals (peasants), 
even in a period of bastardized feudal relations, is 
filled with implications of relationships far more 
complex than these of mighty lords and dependent 
peasants. The hamlets have a corporate personality, 
an identity which comes clearly to the surface in 
those few documents which remain. As the prior don 
Loys and the officials of Logroño argue over the 
jurisdiction of Leza, at the end, it is in the village 
itself where the dispute is finally settled. As the 
town and ecclesiastical representatives gathered 
within and outside the walls of Leza, the local priest, 
the councilmen of the hamlet, and all the "vecinos" 
give their consent and approval to the agreement. 
Only then is the village returned to Santa María de 
Nájera, and the peasants swear to be good vassals. 
We must remember that ¡t was the militia of 
Logroño without any aid from the Crown: a host of 
shoemakers, petty tradesmen, wine dealers, butchers 
and the like, which went out and wrested the village 
from one of the most violent and formidable lords of 
Cast i le . But, of course , from more than three 
centuries, urban contingents had done just that 
(RUIZ, 1994; POWERS, 1988). Throughout all this, 
the king remains an aloof, distant and ineffectual fi-
gure. There is no indication that Alfonso XI knew 
much of the problems plaguing the Rioja, except 
when informed by the plaintive appeals of 
monasteries and towns. There is no indication that, 
even if he did know well the nature of the problem, 
the crown could do much about. Royal charters were 
sent out, often, without even royal knowledge. Tax 
collectors and royal officials visited deserted or 
semi-deserted villages and, more often than not, 
joined the nobility in grasping the last coins, or the 
last fanega of wheat from long suffering peasants 
and urban dwellers, but whatever order prevailed 
depended more on the actions of urban militias or in 
the peasant's determination to defend themselves. 
Although such conditions are not difficult to 
understand for the period between 1312 and 1325, 
when Alfonso XI's minority brought about a state of 
almost complete anarchy, by 1334, after the king's 
ceremonial self-crowning and anointment, one 
would have expected better. 
Not everyone, however, fared as the inhabitants 
of Leza and other villagers, nor every monastery 
enjoyed the protection from which Santa María de 
Nájera had benefitted. On 30 March 1340, at the 
village of Matute, the bells of the church of San 
Román called all the "vecinos" (citizens) and the 
village council: "cléricos, laymen, fijosdalgo 
(nobles) and labradores (farmers)" to a meeting with 
Doña Juana López, abbess of the Cistercian 
monastery of La Asunción in Cañas (near Logroño). 
There, the villagers of Matute requested that the 
number of those collecting dues from them be set at 
three; they also asked that their obligations to the 
monastery be spelled out. Later that day, the abbess 
met again with the villagers and told them that she 
knew all of them were planning to move elsewhere. 
Doña Juana pleaded with the peasants to inform her 
if this was so and to explain why they were taking 
such actions. The village council answered that this 
was true. They wished to leave because the "royal 
merinos ana tax collectors inflicted too many abuses 
on them and sought to collect taxes from which they 
were exempted. Doña Juana asked if she had been 
responsible for any of these abuses, except asking for 
the dues which were rightfully owed to the 
monastery. The council agreed with her, but also 
complained that after the forceful extortion of the 
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royal officiais, there was nothing left they could 
give to the monastery of La Asunción. The abbess 
protested that she could do nothing if the rest of the 
realm also paid these taxes, and that the people of 
Matute knew that the king was on the frontier 
fighting the Moors. The implication being, of 
course, that Alfonso XI required the monies for 
defense. Nevertheless, she agreed to travel to the 
royal court and to beg mercy from the king in the 
name of the council of Matute. She asked them not 
to leave the village and threatened to take all the 
lands in Matute if they did. 
We hear nothing more about Matute until 26 
November 1351. That day, after a long inquest, a 
lengthy brief was recorded. For eleven years, since 
1340, the petty-noblemen and peasants of Matute 
had refused to pay a single penny or the customary 
contributions of bread and hens to the monastery. 
Finally, the abbess, by then a certain doña Teresa de 
Leyva, sought help from the bishop of Calahorra, 
who excommunicated and anathematized all the 
villagers for their refusal to fulfill their obligations. 
The 1351 document also reports the suspension of 
these ecclesiastical punishments by Diego Pérez de 
Trecino, bachelor in decretals, canon and sexton of 
Armenia and vicar of (he bishop of Calahorra, in 
return for the villager's payment of 2,500 mrs. to the 
abbess: the tax arrears of the past eleven years4''. 
49. AHN. Clero 1025, no. 18a (30.3.1340); no. 19 
(26.11.1351). 
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